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THE 1985 AMENDMENTS TO THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA'S NO-FAULT MOTOR VEHICLE
INSURANCE ACT OF 1982: THE FUTURE OF
NO-FAULT INSURANCE IN THE DISTRICT
No-fault automobile insurance, in theory, compensates automobile accident victims for their losses without regard to tort liability.' It was designed
to remedy the weaknesses of the traditional automobile liability insurance
system which critics claimed cost too much to maintain and yet inadequately
compensated victims.2 Under the traditional liability insurance system, automobile accident victims first must establish fault and degree of injury
before compensation can be awarded. In attempting to meet these requirements, victims often face expensive and time-consuming litigation. In contrast, the "no-fault solution" provides that accident victims receive
compensation from their insurance companies for out-of-pocket losses, regardless of fault.' However, along with the certainty of no-fault benefits
comes the requirement that the victim surrender any claim based on the
fault of another that may have arisen from the accident, unless certain exceptions are met. 4
The opponents of no-fault insurance plans,5 refute the claims made by its
1. See IV R.

LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE,

§ 27.02 (1984); R. KEETON &

J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE ACCIDENT VICTIM:

A

BLUEPRINT FOR RE-

FORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, 5 (1965) [hereinafter R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION]; R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW-BASIC TEXT § 4.10 (1971); O'Connell,
Operation of No-Fault Auto Laws: A Survey of the Surveys, 56 NEB. L. REV. 23, 24 (1977).

2. The adequacy of traditional liability insurance as a tool for compensating those who
are injured in automobile accidents has been questioned for over 65 years. See, e.g., R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION, supra note 1; Carmen, Is a Motor Vehicle Conpensation Act Advisable?, 4 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1919); Ellsbree & Roberts, Compulsory Insurance
Against Motor Vehicle Accidents, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 640 (1928); James & Law, Compensation
for Automobile Accident Victims: A Story of Too Little and Too Late, 26 CONN. B. J. 70 (1952);
Morris & Paul, The FinancialImpact ofAutomobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 913 (1962).
3. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION, supra note 1, at 5. This is one of
no-fault insurance's most appealing characteristics. The idea of an expedited payment schedule appeals to those who have grown tired of the delays that are often a part of traditional
liability insurance systems.
4. O'Connell, supra note 1, at 24. For example, prior to 1986 in the District of Columbia, insured victims could sue if their medical expenses exceeded $5,000, if their damages exceeded the total amount of personal injury protection benefits received, or if their injuries met
a specified level of severity. D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2105 (Supp. 1983).
5. This group includes many plaintiffs' attorneys. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 1, at
23; O'Connell & Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-Fault Insurance, 72
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proponents that no-fault increases victims' benefits, reduces delays in the
payment of claims by insurance carriers, diminishes litigation, and keeps insurance costs lower than traditional liability insurance. 6 One commentator
has argued that no-fault's statutory requirements unfairly burden the poor,
the aged, and others with limited economic resources.7 Other critics have
argued that no-fault's promises of reduced cost and litigation are unfulfilled'

and that its guarantee of benefits is misleading. 9
Some critics have focused their attacks on the provisions contained in nofault statutes that require a victim to meet a certain level of either pecuniary
loss from medical expenses or injury severity before he or she brings a suit in
tort or recovers no-fault benefits. ° These provisions, which are known as
thresholds, have been said to invite fraud and abuse by the unscrupulous
automobile accident victim who will falsify or "pad" his or her medical exVA. L. REV. 61, 75 (1986). For an example of what some trial lawyers have proposed as an
alternative to no-fault insurance plans, see M. WOODRUFF, J. FONESCA & A. SQUILLANTE,
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND No-FAULT LAWS § 12.13 (1974).
6. See R. LONG, supra note 1, § 27.03; Green, Basic Protectionand Court Congestion, 52
A.B.A. J. 926, 931 (1966); Morrow, Fault Without Responsibility-An Anachronism, 36 INS.
COUNS. J. 202, 205 (1969); Ring, The Fault With "No-Fault," 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 796,
803-09 (1974); Ross, DRI Studies Refute Court Delay Claims of Critics, 36 INS. COUNs. J.46,
46-47 (1969).
7. See, e.g., Schwartz, Faulty No-Fault:Let the Consumer Beware, 22 CATH. U.L. REV.
746 (1973). The author argues that no-fault insurance hurts senior citizens whose retirement
years become filled with "grief, pain and unhappiness." Id. at 759. Accident victims in lower
economic brackets, according to the author, typically incur substantially lower medical expenses than wealthy victims for the same accident because of medical expense formulas which
allow the wealthy to recover for that injury while denying recovery to the poor. Id. at 759-60.
See also infra note 46.
8. Green, supra note 6, at 931. Professor Green, in a reply to the no-fault insurance plan
put forth by Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell, argued that since most statutes provide for
the retention of tort suits, plus the no-fault benefits, the claimant takes no risk of losing his
basic protection by bringing the tort suit. Furthermore, the claimant's counsel would probably
encourage him to do so.
Thus, Green argued that instead of reducing cost and litigation, no-fault insurance has the
opposite effect because the traditional tort suit, which is retained as a part of every statutory
no-fault insurance act, would continue to occupy a substantial amount of the courts' time. The
problem would be made worse by the vagueness and ambiguity of many no-fault statutes.
Green further argued that the courts in no-fault jurisdictions would be turned into "administrative tribunals, charged with the responsibility of investigating, policing and enforcing the
myriad details of the plan." Id. Therefore, Green felt that no-fault would increase congestion
and delay in the courts and fail to "serve the ends of justice." Id.
9. Ring, supra note 6, at 797, 803-09. Ring argued that the thresholds in no-fault statutes preclude many deserving victims from bringing tort suits. While victims are compensated
for losses that are incidental to the mishap, such as property damage and out-of-pocket losses,
they are woefully undercompensated in comparison with those who are able to bring tort actions. Id.
10. Id. at 805-06.

No-Fault Insurance

1987]

penses in order to meet the statutory standard."'
Despite the criticism of no-fault insurance, twenty-eight jurisdictions have
12
adopted, in one form or another, a no-fault automobile insurance plan.
Following this trend, the District of Columbia City Council enacted the3
"District of Columbia/No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act of 1982."
While many responded to the city council's action with praise for what was
seen as the solution to the city's automobile insurance problems, others felt
that the plan would prove to be too costly.' 4 In 1985, the District of Columbia City Council amended the no-fault insurance statute in response to widespread criticism and challenges concerning its validity.'"
This Note will examine the history of no-fault automobile insurance in the
District of Columbia by evaluating the factors that led to its enactment.
Next, the Note will examine the motivation behind the 1985 amendments.
Finally, this Note will analyze the impact these amendments will have on the
local automobile insurance industry.
I.

THE ADOPTION OF No-FAULT INSURANCE IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA:

A

MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE

The District of Columbia's adoption of a no-fault automobile insurance
plan resulted from the failure of many District motorists to purchase traditional liability insurance and the acknowledgement by the city's lawmakers
that there was a need to implement a more efficient method of compensating
accident victims. 16 Proponents argued that no-fault insurance would lead to
11. Id. at 806.
12. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-4014 to -4021 (1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-4-701 to -723
(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-319 to -351 (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
21, § 2118 (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2101 to -2114 (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730
to .741 (1985); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-34-1 to -13 (Supp. 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 294-1 to
-41 (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3101 to -3121 (1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.39010 to -340 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§ 34A-340 (West
1986); MIcH. COMP. LAWS §§ 500.3101 to .3179 (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65B.41 to .71
(1986); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 679A.010-.130 (1975) (repealed 1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 412 (Supp. 1986); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 39:6A-1 to -20 (1983) (Supp. 1986); N.Y. INS. LAW
§§ 5101-5108 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26-41-01 to -19 (1975) (repealed 1985); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 743.800 to .835 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.101 to .701 (Purdon Supp.
1983) (repealed 1984); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2050-2065 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5611-110 to -250 (Law. Co-op. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 58-23-5 to -8 (Supp. 1986);
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 5.06-3 to 5.12-1 (Vernon 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31-41-1 to -13
(1982) (repealed 1985); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 380.2-100 to -136 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 632.32 to 636.36 (Supp. 1986).
13. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2101 to -2113 (Supp. 1983).
14. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
15. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2101 to -2114 (Supp. 1986).
16. D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2101 (Supp. 1983). This section states that:

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 36:777

faster and larger recoveries to accident victims at less cost, because no-fault
17
would not require a showing of fault.
In 1981, the no-fault insurance controversy sparked great excitement and
a popular outcry in favor of its enactment in the District of Columbia."8
Local insurance companies sent letters to policyholders advocating the nofault concept and urging that policyholders let their views be known to the
city council.' 9 Representatives of the District's trial bar pressured the city
council as well to adopt the bar's position that no-fault insurance was unnecessary and unfair.2 ° The Washington Post favored the adoption of a no-fault
system, characterizing its enactment as "urgent business" and attacking the
position of the area's trial bar."' The American Bar Association, insurance
(a) Findings.-The Council of the District of Columbia finds that:
(1) Motorists, motor vehicle passengers, and pedestrians in the District are not
adequately protected, by current law and practice, from the consequences of motor
vehicle accidents.
(2) If a person suffers personal injuries because of an accident involving a motor
vehicle in the District, he or she is unlikely to recover the amount of his or her
actual losses because:
(A) Approximately 50% of the victims do not satisfy the prerequisites to
compensation under the present law;
(B) Approximately 40% of the operators in the District do not maintain any
motor vehicle insurance or have other financial resources sufficient to pay losses:
(C) The average motor vehicle insurance policy in the District will pay only
up to $10,000 for the personal injuries of any 1 victim, a sum that is insufficient
to compensate adequately a victim with serious injuries; and
(D) Satisfaction of the prerequisites to compensation under the present law is
time-consuming and expensive to policyholders because a victim must establish
that the accident was the fault of another person; that the person injured was
free from contributory fault; and that the injuries suffered were the natural and
probable consequences of the accident.
(3) Far greater protection to victims of motor vehicle accidents is available at a
lower price than that afforded for coverage currently available.
(4) The purchase of this better insurance protection should be compulsory because of the great potential of a motor vehicle to cause personal injury.
(b) Purpose.-It is the purpose of this chapter to provide adequate protection for
victims who are injured in the District or who are injured while riding in motor
vehicles registered or operated in the District.
Id.
17. See Stein, Gee, Today Was a Bad Day... But It's Nobody's Fault: D.C.'s New NoFaultInsurance Law, 8 DISTRIcT LAW. 40, 41 (Mar./Apr. 1984).
18. Id. at 41.
19. Id. In addition to private citizens, representatives of the American Bar Association,
the local trial bar, and the insurance industry all attended. For the most part, the citizens were
in favor of no-fault insurance as it seemed to offer them a hope that the insurance situation in
the city would change. Id.
20. Id.
21. Wash. Post, May 11, 1982 at A18, col. 1. An editorial stated that:
[t]his evening, Washingtonians will find out which D.C. Council members are serious
about making the city's streets safer and providing auto accident victims with swift,
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industry representatives, and private citizens all expressed their views on the
subject to the city council.22
After conducting extensive hearings on the subject, the city council enacted the no-fault automobile insurance act.2" The District's no-fault act
required all residents of the city who owned motor vehicles to purchase in-

surance coverage consisting of personal injury protection, property damage
liability protection, uninsured motorist protection, and third party liability
coverage for accidents occurring outside the District.2 4
A victim who preferred to bring a tort action to recover "noneconomic
loss"25 had to meet at least one of six statutory exceptions.2 6 One of the
exceptions required that a victim's medical expenses must meet or exceed
$5,000,27 which was at the time of the statute's enactment, the highest express monetary threshold of any no-fault jurisdiction.2 8 The statute immediately became the target of criticism by lawyers and others who claimed that
it was one of the most severe of any no-fault statute in the country and that

the $5,000 requirement eliminated the right to sue in all but the most catafair insurance compensation.... It would make auto insurance mandatory and end
the costly process of suits, countersuits, haggling and settling that lines the pockets of
a few trial attorneys before compensating the injured.
Id.
22. Stein, supra note 17, at 41-42. One council member described the hearings as "latent
with emotions" as the various lobbyists "marched through in a traveling road show" trying to
convince the council members to embrace their particular position on the issue. Id. at 41
(quoting Thirty-Ninth Legislative Session, Proceedings, May 25, 1982 (statement of Councilman Clarke)).
23. District of Columbia/No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act of 1982, D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 35-2101 to -2113 (Supp. 1983).
24. Id. § 35-2103.
25. Noneconomic loss was defined as "pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical or mental
impairment, and other nonpecuniary damage recoverable under the tort law applicable to injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle." Id. § 35-2102(19).
26. Id. § 35-2105. This section stated that a suit based on the liability of another could
not be maintained unless (1) the victim's medical expenses exceeded the personal injury protection benefits available to him or her; (2) a death resulted from another's maintenance or use of
a motor vehicle; (3) the injury resulted from another party's use of a motor vehicle with the
intent to harm himself or any other person; (4) the victim's injuries resulted in substantial
permanent scarring or disfigurement; (5) the other party's vehicle was not insured; or (6) the
victim's medical expenses equalled or exceeded $5,000. Id. §§ 35-2105(l)-(6) (amended and
partially repealed 1985).
27. Id. § 35-2105(b)(6).
28. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-714(e) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38323(a)(7) (Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-34-2(13) (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3117
(1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

304.39-060(2)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981); MASS. GEN.

LAWS ANN. ch. 90 § 34M (Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. § 65B.51(3)(a) (1986); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 39:6A-8 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301 (Purdon. Supp. 1986) (repealed 1984);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-41-9(e) (1982) (repealed 1985).
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strophic cases. 29
Amid the high hopes of some people and the criticism of others, no-fault
automobile insurance began what would prove to be an unsteady existence.
The act was expected to be a cure for all the District's automobile insurance
problems. The citizenry had great expectations of no-fault insurance; 30 proponents believed the new system would provide adequate and inexpensive
coverage. 3' The heightened expectations of the public added an additional
burden to the fledgling system
because no-fault insurance had to work well
32
quickly to satisfy everyone.
II.

THE COMPULSORY/NO-FAULT MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE ACT

OF 1982 AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1985

A.

The Reasons Behind the Amendments

The District of Columbia City Council amended the no-fault insurance
statute in 1985. 33 A number of developments, including: (1) a federal district court ruling concerning the act, (2) an investigation by the city government into the act's effectiveness, and (3) the public's general dissatisfaction
with the act's failure to perform as its proponents had promised, led to enactment of the amendments. 34
Until recently, the District of Columbia courts had not ruled on or interpreted the no-fault statute in terms of its constitutional validity. 35 Although
accident victims brought claims under the act's exceptions in the lower
courts, the constitutionality of the no-fault insurance act was not litigated
until 1985. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum29. Winter, D.C Adopts a No-Fault Insurance Plan, 68 A.B.A. J. 1360 (1982). Critics
likened the act to a form of an experiment with the District's motorists as guinea pigs. Id. at
1360.
30. See Stein, supra note 17, at 41.
31. See supra note 21.
32. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 46, 60-63 and accompanying text.
33. The Compulsory/No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act of 1982 Amendments Act
of 1985, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2101 to -2114 (Supp. 1986).
34. See infra notes 46, 50-62 and accompanying text.
35. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has decided at least
three cases dealing with the no-fault statute's applicability to taxicab drivers. In Nasaka v.
Data Access Sys., 602 F. Supp. 761 (D.D.C. 1985), the court held that the exemption of taxicabs from the city's no-fault law applied only to the law's mandatory insurance provision. The
exemption did not prevent a taxicab owner or driver from claiming benefits under the no-fault
law, nor did it entitle the owner or the driver from avoiding the limitations on civil liability set
forth in the act. Id. at 765.
Both Arthur v. Avis Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 82 (D.D.C. 1985) and Adinyede v.
National Children's Center, Inc., No. 84-1515 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 1985) (order granting summary
judgment) reinforced the Nasaka ruling that taxicab drivers are not exempt.
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bia, in Dimond v. District of Columbia,3 6 held the $5,000 requirement of
section 35-2105(b)(6) to be constitutional.37 In doing so, the court reversed
the decision of the federal district court, which had held that the $5,000
amount was unreasonable and a violation of the equal protection clause of
38
the United States Constitution.
In Dimond, a plaintiff who failed to meet any of the section 35-2105 exceptions claimed that the act was unreasonable. 39 Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the $5,000 threshold established an arbitrary and irrational
classification between accident victims whose medical expenses exceeded
$5,000 and those victims whose expenses fell short of that amount.' The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia agreed and invalidated the subsection containing the monetary provision because it unreasonably barred motor vehicle accident victims from recovering their losses.4 1
The court based its holding on its determination that the $5,000 floor was
not rationally related to the no-fault act's professed purpose of providing
adequate protection to District of Columbia motorists.4 2
Although the decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, which held that the threshold and its
36. 792 F.2d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1986). This case involved a challenge to the statute by plaintiffs from the District of Columbia, Virginia, and Maryland. Dimond v. District of Columbia,
618 F. Supp. 519, 523 (D.D.C. 1984).
37. Dimond, 792 F.2d at 182. In addition to the attack on the reasonableness of the
$5,000 requirement, the plaintiffs argued that the entire statute was null and void because the
District of Columbia City Council failed to observe certain procedural requirements of the
District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act. D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 1-201 to -299.7 (Supp. 1986). Dimond, 792 F.2d at 184. While the district court
ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the act on this ground because their claim
was "nothing more than a generalized grievance alleging abstract injury," Dimond, 618 F.
Supp. at 524, the court of appeals allowed the plaintiffs to argue the issue. Dimond, 792 F.2d
at 191. The appellate court, however, ruled against the plaintiffs on the issue, stating that,
although there may have been procedural improprieties in the enactment of the statute, the
causal connection between that and any injury suffered by the plaintiffs was too attenuated and
speculative to warrant the invalidation of the entire statute. Id.
The third attack by the plaintiffs dealt with another alleged violation of the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 1233(a)(4) (1981 & Supp. 1985). The plaintiffs claimed that the $5,000 threshold impermissibly
altered the jurisdiction of both federal and local courts. This was forbidden by the section of
the act in question which prohibited the city council from enacting any provision relating to
the District's courts. Although the federal district court did not reach this issue, the appeals
court did address it, Dimond, 792 F.2d at 184, ruling that the city council had not altered the
local and federal courts' jurisdiction. Id. at 189, 190.
38. Id. at 182.
39. Id. at 184.
40. Id.
41. Dimond, 618 F. Supp. at 526.
42. Id.
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resulting classification were constitutional,43 the importance of the court's
decision was greatly diminished by the amendment of the no-fault statute
while the case was in the midst of appeal.' The court of appeals' reversal
could not cure the damage done to the statute's credibility and strength by
the district court's ruling.
Prior to the judiciary's review of the act, the District of Columbia government had begun to evaluate and assess the effectiveness of no-fault insurance
in the city.4 5 Spurred on by complaints of area motorists4 6 and the finding
of inconsistencies in two of the original act's major premises,4 7 the District's
Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) urged that the
no-fault insurance statute be amended.4" The district court's ruling in Dimond expedited the amendment process because the city government did not
want the citizenry to be in doubt about the effectiveness of the insurance
system while the case was being resolved.49
43. Dimond, 792 F.2d at 182.

44. See id. at 184-85.
45. In August of 1984, Washington, D.C. Mayor Marion Barry approached the District
of Columbia's Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs and requested that the department conduct a study to assess the effectiveness of the no-fault act. Mayor Barry requested
such action even before Dimond was heard in district court because he felt that this was a
matter for the legislature to address and solve, not the judiciary. The Compulsory/No-Fault
Motor Vehicle InsuranceAct of 1982 Amendments Act of 1985: Hearings on Bill 6-249 Before
the Committee on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs Council of the Districtof Columbia, July 3,
1985, Attachment B, at 1-2 [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Carol B. Thompson, Director
of The Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs) (available from the District of Columbia Legislative Services Office).
46. Id. at 3. At the July 3, 1985 hearings, several private citizens voiced their complaints
about the no-fault statute. The Reverend Jerry Moore stated that no-fault insurance was a
burden on the city's poor. He argued that no-fault insurance had failed to deliver the promised
lower premiums and faster settlement of claims and that the accident victim was still in court
"su[ing] his own insurance company to collect rightful compensation." Id. at 8.
Other citizens voiced similar complaints about no-fault insurance. The Reverend Douglas
Moore, a former member of the city council, stated that the no-fault system benefited the
wealthy at the expense of the poor. He argued that:
[w]ealthy people can buy the best medical care and can pay for the best lawyers, so
they can usually find some way to obtain compensation, even under a no-fault system.... But the poor man can't. And that's what I find so terribly unfair and wrong
about this law. It punishes the poor, leaves the wealthy relatively untouched, and
rewards an already prospering industry.
Id. at 10.
Another citizen told of her experiences after an automobile accident left her seriously injured. Under the no-fault insurance system she received no money. She stated, "I've been
without money, food and my rent since the accident.... Now I feel like a burden on myself. I
guess I would have been better off dead. Then at least, I might receive some justice." Id.
(statement of Brina Banks).
47. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
48. Id.
49. Hearings, supra note 45, Attachment B, at 3 (statement of Carol B. Thompson).
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The DCRA discovered that two of the major premises upon which the act
was based were erroneous. The first of the errors was a seventeen percent
overstatement of the estimated number of uninsured motorists in the District
of Columbia at the time of the enactment of the original no-fault act in 1982.
At that time the percentage of uninsured motorists was placed at forty percent,"0 however, the DCRA stated that the figure was actually less than
twenty-three percent.5 1 The DCRA also found that the claim made by the
insurance industry and other proponents of the act that no-fault insurance in
the District would lead to lower insurance premiums was false.5 2 The
DCRA revealed that there had not been any substantial rate reductions and,
in fact, many insurance companies had requested rate increases.5 3 Thus, the
federal district court's ruling in Dimond that a significant portion of the act
was unconstitutional along with the DCRA's discovery of the erroneous
premises prompted the city council to make substantial adjustments to the
no-fault insurance act.
As part of its decision making process, the DCRA held a public hearing
that strengthened its position that change was needed.54 It heard testimony
from government officials, community organizations, private citizens, representatives of the local bar, and the insurance industry.5 5 Except for the insurance industry and a handful of community organizations that opposed
any changes to the existing law, 56 the overriding opinion of those in attendCODE ANN. § 35-2101(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1983).
51. Hearings,supra note 45, Attachment B, at 2 (statement of Carol B. Thompson). The

50. D.C.

DCRA based this conclusion on insurance records that were investigated by that department.
The records dated back to the time of the statute's enactment in 1982. Id.
52. See id.
53. Id. The DCRA based this conclusion on the receipt of recent insurance records and
reports. Id.
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id. at 4-10.
56. Id. at 5-9. Representatives of the insurance industry argued that the amendments
were premature because the no-fault law had not been in effect long enough to assess its impact. August P. Alegi, vice-president and deputy general counsel of GEICO Insurance Com-

pany, asserted that making personal injury protection (PIP) coverage optional would hurt the
poor who would probably choose not to purchase the coverage despite their lack of any other
source of compensation. In addition, Alegi asserted that the optional coverage would cause
health insurance to become the primary source of benefits, unfairly shifting the cost of auto
accidents to those who did not drive, particularly the aged and the poor. Id. at 6.
Grover Czech, regional vice-president of the American Insurance Association, voiced simi-

lar objections to the amendments. He also stated that the solution was not to repeal no-fault
but rather to remove all compulsory coverages except the no-fault PIP component. This alteration would result, he asserted, in an effective law that would be inexpensive, protect everyone,
and allow for the voluntary purchase of additional coverage. Id.
Spokesmen for the Federation of Civic Associations, The District of Columbia Legislative
Committee of the American Association of Retired Persons, and The Chevy Chase Advisory
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ance was that no-fault insurance in the District had failed to live up to its
original promises. 7 While their reasons for the amendments differed, all
agreed that a change in the present law was necessary. 5
A great number of those testifying at the hearing were private citizens.

Their dissatisfaction with the act stemmed from the high hopes that had
accompanied the enactment of no-fault insurance in the District.59 The
promises that were made by no-fault insurance's proponents of lower insurance costs and greater certainty of benefits to the injured, had led the public
to believe that no-fault would eliminate much of what was wrong with automobile insurance in the city. However, the tensions that ran throughout the
community during the enactment of the original act prevented a calm consideration of the utility of the no-fault insurance statute. 60 But shortly after
its passage, the public viewed the act as abrogating their choice of what type

of insurance to buy and eliminating their right to bring suit if they so

chose.61 When the system failed to live up to the public's expectations, to
severe criticism of the no-fault insurance system resulted. 62 These concerns

were carefully considered by the District's lawmakers as they began work on
the new no-fault bill. The lawmakers also may have been concerned with
not making the same mistakes twice.
The 1985 amendments, the DCRA claimed, would provide policyholders
with an opportunity to control the cost of automobile insurance by allowing
them to select an insurance plan that best fit their needs.6 3 The amendments
Neighborhood Commission also opposed the amendments. These groups voiced complaints
similar to those of the insurance industry representatives. Id. at 9.
57. Id. at 4, 6-10.
58. Id. Private citizens and civic organizations supported the amendments because they
felt that the present no-fault statute was not an adequate source of compensation for the injured and because they felt exploited under the present act. See supra note 46.
Representatives of the local trial bar promoted the amendment because it would lead to
more tort suits and, thus, more business for them. The attorneys also argued that the rate of
increase of insurance premiums was greater in no-fault jurisdictions than in those jurisdictions
utilizing traditional liability insurance. Hearings,supra note 45, Attachment B, at 1 (statement
of Edward L. Norward, president of the Association of Plaintiffs' Trial Attorneys of Metropolitan Washington).
These findings are supported by a study conducted by the National Association of Independent Insurers (NAII). According to the NAII study, no-fault insurance has failed to deliver
rate reductions and has increased costs to the insured public. By September of 1975, the NAII
study concluded that the cost of no-fault insurance was higher than the cost of insurance under
traditional liability systems. R. LONG, supra note 1, § 27.03. See also Knepper, Review of
1976 Tort Trends, 26 DEF. L.J. 1, 23 (1977).
59. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
60. See Hearings, supra note 45, Attachment B, at 1 (statement of Carol B. Thompson).
61. See supra note 46.
62. Id.
63. Hearings,supra note 45, Attachment B, at 3 (statement of Carol B. Thompson).

No-Fault Insurance

19871

brought about many changes. Among other things, the amendments abolished the mandatory nature of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits,"
increased the amount of benefits available to those who are seriously injured

in an accident 65 and eliminated the $5,000 requirement. 66 As a result, the
District now has an insurance statute that is a hybrid between no-fault and
traditional liability systems. It remains to be seen whether the new act will
accomplish the benefits that were not realized in the 1982 no-fault act.
B.

Substantive Changes in the No-Fault Statute

The District of Columbia's no-fault insurance act has undergone an enormous transformation in its text and effect. The major changes deal with the
types of insurance coverage that must be purchased by motorists, 67 the procedures to institute a tort suit,68 methods of dispute resolution 69 and statutory coverage. 7 ° The DCRA stated that the act was amended in order to
offer city motorists an opportunity to take control of the way their insurance
dollars are spent and to allow motorists to select the coverage best suited for

their needs. 71 Thus, the success or failure of the amendments must be
judged according to this standard.
The amendments' greatest impact is upon the type of insurance required
to be purchased and the requirements that one must meet in order to bring a

tort suit. The purchase of PIP coverage, which was the mainstay of the 1982
64. D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2104(a)(1) (Supp. 1986). The newly amended section states
that "[i]n addition to insurance required to be provided by an insurer under § 35-2106, each
insurer shall offer to each person required to have insurance under this chapter optional personal injury protection insurance .... " Id.
65. Id. § 35-2106(f)(2). Under the amended section, a person is to receive coverage up to
$25,000 for injuries from any one accident. Id. This amount was only $10,000 before the
amendments. D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2106(f)(2) (Supp. 1983). In addition, the total amount
of coverage for all accident victims in any one accident has been increased to $50,000. D.C.
CODE ANN. § 35-2106(f)(2) (Supp. 1986). This is an increase of $30,000 over the original nofault insurance act. D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2106(f)(2) (Supp. 1983).
66. See Official Comments to D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2105(b) (Supp. 1986).
67. Id. § 35-2106(a)(l)(D). The amended statute states that each insurer shall provide
property damage liability coverage, third party personal liability protection and uninsured motorist protection. Id.
68. Id. § 35-2105(b). For an insured to recover both PIP benefits and maintain a tort suit,
the victim must either meet a certain level of injury severity or the victim's medical and rehabilitation expenses must exceed the $50,000 amount of PIP benefits available. Id.
69. Id. § 35-2105(b)(2)(h). This section establishes that any person having a claim arising
out of the mandatory insurance coverage or the optional insurance coverage may request that
the claim be resolved by arbitration before the Board of Consumer Claims Arbitration for the
District of Columbia. Id.
70. Id. § 35-2103.
71. See Hearings, supra note 45, Attachment B, at 3, 8-9 (statement of Carol B.
Thompson).
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no-fault act, is no longer mandatory. 72 The compulsory nature of PIP coverage has been eliminated in order to ensure that citizens will have the ability to fashion their insurance coverage to fit both their needs and budgets."
Whereas under the pre-amendment Act city motorists resented the forced
purchase of certain types of insurance coverage, the amendments grant motorists a choice in deciding what is best for them. The District's motorists
must now elect whether to receive PIP coverage. 74 If a person elects to receive the benefits, that person will be entitled to receive compensation based
on the level of coverage purchased. 7 5
For those who choose to forego the PIP coverage, their compensation for
losses resulting from an automobile accident must come from another
source. The source could include either a health insurance policy 76 or a tort
action against the other party. The availability of an action in tort is open to
all who opt not to purchase PIP coverage. 77 Although motorists may now
elect to receive PIP benefits, the no-fault statute still governs the ability of
motorists to bring tort claims as well as recover no-fault benefits. 78 However, the city council has eliminated the $5,000 threshold requirement that
created the controversy in Dimond.79
The city's lawmakers have replaced the monetary provision with a strict
statutory requirement that must be met before a suit may be brought by the
insured.8 ° The provision is a statutory description of the types of injuries or
damages that are sufficient to enable an insured to sue in tort." This change
effectuates the intent of the District government to provide the citizenry with
72. D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2104 (Supp. 1986).
73. See Hearings, supra note 45, Attachment B, at 3, 8-9 (statement of Carol B.
Thompson).
74. D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2105(a) (Supp. 1986). Victims are to notify an insurer within
60 days of an accident of their intention to receive personal injury protection benefits. Id.
75. Id. § 35-2104. One package would be worth $100,000 in medical and rehabilitation
expenses, $24,000 for work loss and $4,000 for funeral expenses. The second level would allow
an insured to purchase coverage up to $50,000 for medical and rehabilitation expenses,
$12,000 for work loss and $4,000 for funeral expenses. The additional level creates an alternative for middle and lower income residents to obtain coverage to meet their needs. Id. See
Hearings, supra note 45, Attachment B, at 3, 11 (statement of Carol B. Thompson).
76. See Hearings,supra note 45, Attachment B, at 3 (statement of Carol B. Thompson).
77. Id.
78. D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2105(b) (Supp. 1986).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. The statute's provision states that an insured may bring suit in tort if:
[t]he injury directly results in substantial permanent scarring or disfigurement, substantial and medically demonstrable permanent impairment which has significantly
affected the ability of the victim to perform his or her professional activities or usual
and customary daily activities, or a medically demonstrable impairment that prevents the victim from performing all or substantially all of the material acts and
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choice and control over insurance matters. Motorists may now decide not to
purchase excess or inappropriate coverage.8 2
The amendments also establish an innovative arbitration program that
dissatisfied motorists may utilize in lieu of bringing a lawsuit.8 3 Theoretically, the arbitration system will reduce the dockets of the city's courts,
84
which, in the past, have been forced to handle a great deal of these cases.
If successful, the arbitration plan would bring about a court-like resolution
without the costs normally associated with a formal court proceeding. 5
The amended no-fault insurance statute also allows an insured to specifically exclude certain persons from coverage under the policy.8 6 This new
option furthers individual choice and control because a policyholder will
now be able to bar a careless driver from coverage and thus reduce the possibility of higher insurance premiums in the future.8 7 The goal of the amendment is to give the city's motorists a choice in how to spend their money for
insurance coverage. In trying to achieve this goal, it appears that the city
council and other lawmakers have tried to effectuate a low cost insurance
system without the use of a strict no-fault plan.
C.

The Future of Automobile Insurance in the District of Columbia

The amendments to the 1982 no-fault automobile insurance statute
demonstrate an attempt by the city government to answer the needs of its
citizens. The hybrid insurance system created by these amendments indicates the government's desire to have the best of both no-fault and traditional insurance systems.
While the severity of injury threshold requirement now contained in section 35-2105(b)(1) is similar to those used by other no-fault jurisdictions at
one time or another,8 8 little else about the present act is typical of a no-fault
duties that constitute his or her usual customary daily activities for more than 180
continuous days.
Id. § 35-2105(b)(1).
82. See Hearings, supra note 45, Attachment B,, at 3, 8-9 (testimony of Carol B.
Thompson).
83. D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2105(h)(1) (Supp. 1986).
84. See Hearings,supra note 45, Attachment B, at 6-7 (testimony of Carol B. Thompson).
It is interesting to note that while attorneys advocated the adoption of the amendments, the

very adoption of the amendments could serve to reduce the amount of work for the city's trial
bar. This would result because the new system's arbitration plan seeks to do away with the

need for attorneys and courtrooms in dispute resolution.
85. Id.
86. D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2102(10) (Supp. 1986).
87. See Hearings, supra note 45, Attachment B, at 7 (statement of Carol B. Thompson).
88. The provision contained in this section, see supra note 81, is similar to the thresholds
of Michigan and New York's no-fault statutes. The Michigan statute states that: "[a] person

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 36:777

statute. The actions by the city council evidence both a desire to reap the
benefits of a no-fault system and to avoid Dimond-type challenges in the
future. By granting more choice and offering concessions to those who favor
no-fault insurance and to those who favor traditional liability insurance systems, the city council tried to achieve a more efficient, equitable and cost
effective system.
The amendments fall short of what some commentators have advocated as
the resolution of the no-fault insurance versus traditional liability insurance
dilemma.89 However, the new statute could serve to eliminate one of the
major problems in a no-fault insurance jurisdiction-double recovery or
"double dipping", 90 which arises in jurisdictions with no-fault insurance
remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ... use of a motor
vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or
permanent serious disfigurement." MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.3135(1) (1983).
The Michigan courts have construed their no-fault act strictly and have found that the statute's purpose is to keep minor cases out of the courtrooms. McKendrick v. Petrucci, 71 Mich.
App. 200, 211, 247 N.W.2d 349, 354 (1976). The statutory scheme permits those who are
catastrophically injured to be compensated. Workman v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 404
Mich. 477, 509, 274 N.W.2d 373, 386 (1979). The Michigan court's approach is to interpret
the threshold as being a bar to all recovery for noneconomic loss unless the injury involved is
severe, which also relieves "the courts of the burden of litigation where injury is not serious."
Byer v. Smith, 419 Mich. 541, 546, 357 N.W.2d 644, 646 (1984).
New York's no-fault insurance statute allows for recovery in tort if there has been a serious
injury to the victim. N.Y. INs. LAW art. 51, § 5104 (1985). A serious injury is defined as:
[A] personal injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement;
a fracture... significant limitation of use of body function or system; or a medically
determined injury or impairment of a nonpermanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute
such person's usual and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the one hundred eighty days immediately following the occurrence of the injury
or impairment.
N.Y. INS. LAW art. 51 § 5102(d) (1982). The New York provision was justified at its inception
because it would significantly decrease the number of litigated automobile personal injury
cases. Licari v. Elliot, 57 N.Y.2d 230, 236, 455 N.Y.S.2d 570, 573, 441 N.E.2d 1088, 1091
(1982). Thus, the courts of New York have also interpreted their threshold strictly and sought
to keep the number of personal injury cases to a reasonable level.
89. O'Connell & Joost, supra note 5, at 62-63. The authors suggest that to bridge the gap
between the two types of insurance, motorists should be given a choice between the two when
purchasing insurance. Any problems that would result because of the differences between the
two systems would be resolved by an extension of uninsured motorist benefits. Id. at 79. Uninsured motorist benefits are provided in no-fault insurance packages to compensate traditional
insured who are injured by a no-fault insured. As the authors state, "[w]ith the uninsured
motorist connector in place, a traditional insured who is hurt in an accident with a no-fault
insured would recover tort liability damages on the same basis as in a current tort-based system." Id. The uninsured motorist connector would take the place of a tort suit. Although the
traditional insured would pay more for the uninsured motorist coverage, "this additional cost
would be offset by lower liability insurance premiums because of the traditional insured's immunity from suits by no-fault insureds." Id.
90. Id. at 70-71.
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that allows motorists to recover in tort as well as receive no-fault benefits. 9 '
This phenomenon causes an increase in both the victim's total compensation
as well as the cost of everyone's insurance, thus undermining one of no-fault
92
insurance's professed benefits.
The District's amended statute and its new verbal threshold requirement,
if given a literal interpretation by the area's courts, should lead to the elimination of double recovery in most cases. If the District of Columbia courts
follow what other jurisdictions have held as sufficient to meet similar statutory language, a victim will have to suffer serious injuries or damages in
order to bring a tort suit. 93 If courts interpret the statute strictly, then
double recovery will be precluded. This strict interpretation should occur
because of the fact that an insured can now choose whether to purchase nofault PIP coverage. With choice now a part of the District of Columbia
automobile insurance system, motorists who once felt forced into purchasing
coverage should be satisfied. The courts, noting that choice is now available,
should be less receptive to allowing tort suits to be brought as a method of
compensation. Thus, a victim who elects to receive PIP benefits should not
be allowed to bring a tort suit unless he or she clearly falls within one of the
94
two statutory exceptions.
The amended version of the District of Columbia no-fault automobile insurance act offers more choice and instills fairness into a system that has
been clouded with complaints of unfairness. Whether the statute will be successful depends on whether the city government and the public will show
patience in allowing the system to operate. It does appear that the amendments were planned and enacted in a rational manner, free from much of the
chaos and heightened expectations that surrounded the passage of the original act.95
IV.

CONCLUSION

With the 1985 amendments, the District of Columbia government has attempted to effectuate lower insurance costs, provide more choice for consumers, and induce more universal satisfaction with insurance coverage.
The 1982 no-fault act did not adequately provide benefits in the manner that
its proponents had predicted it would. Whether the amended version can
succeed where its predecessor failed depends on a number of factors, includ91. Id.
92. Id. at 70.
93. See supra note 88.
94. D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2105(b)(1), (2) (Supp. 1986).

95. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
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ing the interpretation given to the act by the courts and the citizenry's willingness to abide by the statute's provisions.
With the District government's realization that insurance costs are unlikely to decrease in the future, the amended act appears to be a good faith
attempt to give its constituency the ability to contain any increase in costs.
Given the fact that there is an element of choice presented to the insured,
there may be more satisfaction with the act. The satisfaction of the citizenry, combined with more reasonable expectations concerning the benefits
the city can derive from an insurance system, should result in an improvement in automobile insurance in the District of Columbia.
Mark V Holden

